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ABSTRACT
The cloud computing paradigm offers clients ubiquitous and on-
demand access to a shared pool of computing resources, enabling
the clients to provision scalable services with minimal management
effort. Such a pool of resources, however, is typically owned and
controlled by a single service provider, making it a single-point-of-
failure. This paper presents Kosto – a framework that provisions
a fair marketplace for secure outsourced computations, wherein the
pool of computing resources aggregates resources offered by a large
cohort of independent compute nodes. Kosto protects the confiden-
tiality of clients’ inputs as well as the integrity of the outsourced
computations and their results using trusted hardware’s enclave
execution, in particular Intel SGX. Furthermore, Kosto warrants fair
exchanges between the clients’ payments for the execution of an
outsourced computations and the compute nodes’ work in servicing
the clients’ requests. Empirical evaluation on the prototype imple-
mentation of Kosto shows that performance overhead incurred
by enclave execution is as small as 3% for computation-intensive
operations, and 1.5× for I/O-intensive operations.
1 INTRODUCTION
The cloud computing paradigm features a service provider offer-
ing its clients convenient and on-demand access to a shared pool
of computing resources, enabling the latter to provision scalable
services with minimal management effort. In such a model, clients
typically entrust the cloud service provider to handle their data, to
perform their outsourced computations, and tometer their cost foot-
print acurately (e.g., CPU-cycle, network bandwidth, storage) [50].
Although the clients may enjoy a wide range of cloud computing
services, they are all offered by and at discretion of a few specific
service providers.
Recent years have witnessed an emergence of online market-
places that are in competition with traditional vendor-specific ser-
vice providers. Examples include Airbnb [1] in lodging, Uber [15]
in transportation, and Golem [2] in outsourced computations. In
such marketplaces, the shared pool of resources is no longer owned,
provisioned and controlled by a single party, but rather aggregates
those that are offered by a large cohort of independent providers.
Designing a fair marketplace for secure outsourced computations,
however, faces various challenges.
The first challenge is in protecting the confidentiality of the
clients’ data and the integrity of the outsourced computations,
for the resource providers (or compute nodes) may be untrust-
worthy. Solutions to protect the confidentiality and integrity of
outsourced computations have been studied in the literature [28–
30, 57]. For examples, homomorphic encryption [29, 57] and secure
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multi-party computation [30] are designed to protect data confi-
dentiality, while verification by replications [2, 13] and verifiable
computation [28] aim to protect computation integrity. Neverthe-
less, these approaches either incur prohibitive overheads or support
only a limited range of applications, hindering their adoption in
practical systems.
Another challenge is in codifying fair exchanges between clients’
payments for the execution of the outsourced computations and
compute nodes’ work in servicing the clients’ requests. In the “pay-
as-you-use” metering model where clients are billed based on the
computing resources that their requested services consume, both
clients and compute nodes have strong economic interests to falsify
the resource metering (e.g., the compute nodes try to overcharge
the clients, while the latter aim to be undercharged). One approach
is to fix a remuneration for a task before hand, and let the compute
node collect such reward once it returns a correct result for that task.
To guarantee fairness, the remuneration might be deposited into an
escrow held between the client and the compute node, which auto-
matically and anomously releases the reward to the compute node
upon successful task completion, or returns it to the client after a
certain time-out. This approach, however, does not generalize. In
particular, with micro tasks that yield very small remunerations, the
transaction fee (i.e., the cost to conduct the payment transaction,
which is often unproportional to the transaction value) becomes an
overhead. In case of macro tasks, compute nodes may inadvertently
abort the tasks midway (perhaps due to overly-extensive resource
consumption), spending certain computational work but could not
claim the reward. An ideal solution to enable fair exchanges be-
tween the clients and the compute nodes would require trusted
metering of the latter’s work and an self-enforcing or autonomous
agent that is responsible for settling payments between the two
parties based on the metering.
In this paper, we present Kosto – a framework that enables a fair
marketplace for secure outsourced computations. Unlike in vendor-
specific cloud services, a shared pool of computing resources in
Kosto aggregates a large cohort of independent compute nodes each
of which is capable of provisioning a Trusted Execution Environ-
ment (TEE) (e.g., using Intel SGX) for outsourced computations.
The TEE provisioned by SGX, called an enclave, prevents other
applications, the operating system and even the host owner of the
compute node from tampering with the execution of application
loaded within or observing its state, thus guaranteeing data confi-
dentiality and computation integrity. A client in Kosto can request
computational services from the compute nodes, while enjoying
confidentiality protection on their data and integrity assurance
on their outsourced computations. The compute nodes service the
clients’ requests by executing the outsourced computation inside
an enclave that is attested to be correctly instantiated. Moreover,
Kosto enables fair exchange between the clients and compute nodes
via a novel hybrid architecture that combines TEE-based metering
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with blockchain micro payment channel [12, 47]. More specifically,
Kosto incorporates in each enclave that houses the outsourced com-
putation an accounting logic that correctly meters the compute
node’s work. Such metering is then translated to a payment promise
with which the compute node can settle the escrow and claim the
corresponding reward. This allows the fair exchange between the
client’s payment and the compute node’s work in executing the
outsourced task, without incurring high overhead (i.e., transaction
fee) or involving a trusted third party.
Besides, to facilitate the matching between clients and compute
nodes, Kosto designates brokers to collect resource advertisements
from available compute nodes as well as task requests from clients.
The brokers then evaluate among the requests and offers it receives
appropriate assignments of tasks to compute nodes. We devise
a solution for maximum task assignment in a dynamic settings
wherein the broker continuously receives new requests from the
clients and resource offers from the compute nodes. To eliminate
monopoly of broker and avoid single-point-of-failure, Kosto allows
multiple brokers to co-exist, wherein a client or a compute node
can also play a role of self-serving broker.
Empirical evaluations on the prototype implementation of Kosto
reveals that the overhead incurred by enclave execution and
the trusted metering is reasonable, which is as small as 3% for
computation-intensive operations, and 1.5× for I/O-intensive opera-
tions. We remark that while Kosto is fully compatible with optimiza-
tions that enhance the efficiency of enclave execution [46, 55, 58],
our prototype implementation does not include them. Thus, we
expect the results reported in our evaluations (Section 6) to be an
over-estimation of the real overhead that enclave execution incurs
over unstrusted non-enclave execution, and the fully optimized
implementation of Kosto to attain better efficiency.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions.
• We propose Kosto – a framework enabling a fair market-
place for secure outsourced computations that protects con-
fidentiality of clients’ inputs and integrity of the outsourced
computations.
• We codify in Kosto a protocol that warrants fair exchanges
between clients’ payments for the execution of the out-
sourced computations and compute nodes’ work in servicing
the clients’ requests.
• We devise a task assignment mechanism that optimally
matches pending requested tasks against available compute
nodes in the system.
• We conduct extensive experiments to demonstrate Kosto’s
practicality. The experiments shows that performance over-
head incurred by enclave execution and trusted metering
is as small as 3% for computation-intensive operations, and
1.5× for I/O-intensive operations.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. We provide nec-
essary backgrounds on Intel SGX, cryptocurrencies and their pay-
ment channels, as well as prior work on marketplace for outsourced
computations in Section 2. Next, we give an overview of Kosto in
Section 3, before presenting its design in Section 4. We then anal-
yse its security in Section 5 and conduct empirical evaluation in
Section 6. Finally, we survey the related works in Section 7 before
concluding our work in Section 8.
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Trusted Execution Environment
Kosto leverages Intel SGX [17, 41] to provision a Trusted Execution
Environment (TEE) that protects confidentiality and integrity of
the clients’ data and computations. Nonetheless, we remark that
Kosto is compatible with any other mechanism featuring similar
capabilities. In the following, we summarize key features of Intel
SGX’s TEEs.
Intel SGX [41] is a set of CPU extensions capable of providing
hardware-protected TEE (or enclave) for generic computations. It
enables a host to instantiate multiple enclaves at the same time.
An enclave is isolated from other enclaves, from the operating
system (OS), and from the host itself. Each enclave is associated
with a protected address space. The trusted processor blocks any
non-enclave code’s attempt to access the enclave memory. Memory
pages can be swapped out of the enclavememory, but it is encrypted
using the processor’s key prior to leaving the enclave.
Intel SGX provides attestation mechanisms that allows an attest-
ing enclave to demonstrate to a validator that it has been properly
instantiated with the correct code [17]. In addition, the attestation
mechanism also enables the attesting enclave and the validator
to establish a secure, authenticated channel via which they can
securely communicate sensitive data.
If the validator is another enclave instantiated on the same plat-
form with the attesting enclave, the two parties engage in a local
attestation mechanism. Abstractly, once the code in question has
been initiated inside the attesting enclave, the trusted processor
computes a measurement of the initiated code (i.e., the hash of its
initial state). Next, it produces a message authentication code (MAC)
of such measurement using a key that is known only to the hard-
ware and the validating enclave. Based on the measurement and the
MAC, the validating enclave can verify if the attesting enclave has
been instantiated correctly. Alternatively, if the validator is a remote
party outside of the platform, the trusted processor creates a remote
attestation by signing the attesting enclave’s measurement with
the hardware’s private key under the Enhance Privacy ID (EPID)
scheme [33] [17]. The remote party obtaining the attestation then
requests Intel’s Attestation Service (IAS) to verify the signature
contained in the attestation on its behalf [6].
Recent attacks on Intel SGX show that enclave execution may be
vulnerable to side-channel leakage [60], to which various defenses
have been proposed [25, 38, 53, 56]. Kosto is compatible with these
side-channel leakage defenses.
2.2 Cryptocurrencies and Micro Payment
Channel
Cryptocurrencies. Decentralised cryptocurrencies have gained
considerable adoption since the introduction of Bitcoin [44]. They
are typically administered on the public ledger that is secured and
maintained by a set of independent peer-to-peer network oper-
ators (or miners). Cryptocurrencies allow any two willing par-
ties to transact directly with one another without relying on any
trusted third party. While our discussion focuses on the Ethereum
blockchain [20] due to its popularity and the expressive capability
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of its ecosystem, payment in Kosto can be settled using any other
currency that enables similar properties.
Smart Contract and Payment Escrow. Ethereum enables smart
contract (or contract for short), which is an “autonomous agent”
stored in the blockchain. A contract is associated with a prede-
fined executable code. Incentive and security mechanisms of the
Ethereum ecosystem encourage miners to execute the contract’s
code faithfully [20]. While various works have shown that miners
could be incentivized to deviate from the contract code, they only
apply to contracts that require nontrivial computation effort [39].
Smart contract could be used to implement an escrow that enables
fair exchange between two parties without relying on a trusted third
party. The escrow enforces a payment from a payer to a payee once
the payee has delivered some service to the payer, while keeping
the payment inaccessible to the payee before such delivery. Kosto
employs this capability to facilitate fair exchange between clients
and compute nodes.
Transaction Fee. The contract implementing the escrow can be
invoked by a transaction in the Ethereum network. Each such
transaction is associated with a transaction fee which is typically
proportional to the execution complexity of the contract. In another
words, the cost of settling the escrow does not necessarily depend on
themonetary value that the escrow holds. Should the payment value
is too small (i.e., micro transaction), the transaction fee becomes a
significant overhead.
Blockchain Scalability. The core component underlying cryp-
tocurrencies is a consensus protocol which enables all (honest)
peers in the network to “agree” on the same transaction history
and to avoid double-spending. Consensus protocol in Ethereum’s
currently processes only a dozen of transactions per second1. Due
to this limitations, Kosto’s design has to restrict the number of
on-chain transactions, while still offering fine-grained resource
metering and payment.
Payment Channel. Payment channel enables two parties to trans-
act a large number of micro payments without incurring high trans-
action fee or overloading the blockchain with excessive number
of transactions [12, 47]. A payer establishes a channel to a payee
by depositing a maximum amount of value that they wish to be
transacted into an escrow on the blockchain. Subsequently, when a
payer wants to make a micro payment to the payee, instead of post-
ing the transaction to the blockchain, he issues a digitally signed
and hash-locked transfer, called payment promise, and sends it off-
chain to the payee. The value contained in the payment promises
should not exceed the on-chain deposit that was set up previously,
otherwise it cannot be fully collateralized.
The escrow was programmed such that it can only be closed
once using a single payment promise. The payment promises given
to the payee have increasing value, where in each promise contains
the sum of its immediate predecessor and the current micro pay-
ment. Let us assume the payer intends to make n micro payments
whose values are ⟨v1,v2, · · · ,vn⟩. The ith payment promise takes
the value of
∑i
k=1vk , invalidating all its predecessors. The payee
can close the escrow at any time and claim the payment she has
been promised so far by posting the last payment promise she re-
ceived to the escrow. Upon receiving a closing payment promise,
1https://www.etherchain.org/
the escrow transfers the value indicated in the payment promise
to the payee, and the remaining portion, if any, to the payer. This
mechanism allows two parties to transact a very large number
of micro payments using only two on-chain transactions (one for
opening the channel, the other for closing it).
2.3 Prior Work on Marketplace for Outsourced
Computations: Golem
The most closely related project to Kosto is Golem [2]. The Golem
network connects computers in a peer-to-peer network, and al-
lows application owners and individual users to rent computing
resources from other users’ machines (i.e., compute nodes) to exe-
cute their tasks. Golem incorporates a dedicated Ethereum-based
transaction system to facilitate direct payments between involved
parties. Nonetheless, the current architecture and system designs
of Golem face several challenges that are left unresolved.
First, Golem does not offer attested execution, allowing compute
nodes to tamper with correct execution of outsourced tasks, or
return bogus results. To verify the compute nodes’ outputs, Golem
has to repeat the same computation at different compute nodes,
employing a majority voting principle to determine the correct
result. This approach is not only subject to high overhead due to
the redundant execution, but also susceptible to collusion wherein
malicious compute nodes conspire to output the same incorrect
result so as evade the voting.
Second, Golem does not feature trusted fine-grained metering.
Compute nodes in Golem are only eligible to claim remuneration if
they successfully finish the task and return correct results. If the
assigned tasks are too large and they inadvertently have to abort
midway (e.g., the task was ill-defined or consuming an unexpectedly
large amount of resource), they cannot claim any reward despite
having spent certain computation work. Further, a probabilistic
nanopayment scheme in Golem2 requires compute nodes to actively
involve in the system for a potentially long period of time before
being able to collect its reward [21].
Finally, Golem requires the outsourced task to adhere to certain
templates as defined in their task and transaction framework. This
adherence is necessary for Golem’s task verification and remunera-
tion mechanisms. Nonetheless, the expressiveness of Golem’s task
templates remains to be seen.
3 SYSTEM OVERVIEW
This section presents an overview of Kosto, focusing on its archi-
tecture and desired properties. We then state the threat model and
assumptions that we make in designing Kosto. Finally, we introduce
a strawman design that we shall convert step-by-step into Kosto.
3.1 Kosto overview
Kosto is a framework that enables a fair marketplace for secure
outsourced general-purposed computations. Unlike vendor-specific
cloud services, the pool of computing resources in Kosto aggregates
those offered by a large cohort of independent compute nodes (which
2The payment scheme essentially runs the lottery among n compute nodes
⟨C1, C2, . . . , Cn ⟩, wherein Ci expects a payment of vi . The lottery reward is
V =
∑n
i=1 vi , and the winning probability of participant Ci is vi /V . The winning
node collects the whole sum V , while others receive nothing.
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we shall discuss in more details below). Computation and data that
are executed and processed in Kosto enjoy strong confidentiality
and integrity protections, thanks to the use of TEE on the compute
nodes. Further, Kosto ensures fair exchange between the clients
and compute nodes via a novel hybrid architecture that combines
TEE-based metering with the Ethereum blockchain3. The Kosto
architecture comprises three main parties: clients, compute nodes
and brokers.
• Clients are end users of Kosto. A client would like to the ex-
ecute a program Program on an input Input. The program
Program can be written by the client, or an open-source
software provided by a third party. In either case, the client
outsources such computational task to a compute node. For
practical usability reason, the clients are not expected to
maintain constant connection with the compute node exe-
cuting its program over the course of the outsourced com-
putation.
• Compute nodes are machines equipped with trusted pro-
cessors (e.g., Intel SGX processors) that are capable of provi-
sioning TEEs (or enclaves). A compute node services a client
request by running its code in an enclave, and generating an
attestation that proves the correctness of the code execution
(and thus the result). In return, the compute node receives
remuneration v proportional to computational work it has
asserted in executing the outsourced task.
• Brokers facilitate node discovery as well as load balanc-
ing. Moreover, the brokers assist the clients in attesting that
the compute nodes have correctly instantiated the enclaves
housing the outsourced computations. Brokers may charge
clients and/or compute nodes certain commission fee in re-
turn to their services. Kosto eliminates broker monopoly and
single-point-of-failure by allowing multiple brokers to co-
exist, thus enabling better brokering service for both clients
and compute nodes.
Work flow. Hereafter, we denote by P a client, by C a compute
node, and by B a broker. To achieve desired properties (discussed
in Section 3.2), Kosto requires Program to be instrumented into a
program ProgKT that incorporates dynamic runtime checks over
the execution of Program. P and C can post their requests and
available resource offers, respectively, to a broker B of their choice,
perhaps based on the broker’s reputation or quality of service.
B then evaluates among all requests and offers it has receives
a suitable assignments of clients’ requests to available compute
nodes. Alternatively, the clients and the compute nodes can directly
discover and connect to each other. In such an approach, the clients
serve as their own broker, rendering the clients heavyweight. Once
P and C are matched, P commits a payment v to an escrow on the
Ethereum blockchain, and sends pkg = ⟨ProgKT, Enc(kP , Input),
AuxData⟩ to C, wherein Enc() is a symantically secure symmetric-
key encryption scheme [34], and AuxData contains auxiliary data
that is needed for the execution (e.g., the proof thatP has committed
a payment v to the escrow). C then instantiates a ProgKT enclave,
and attests that the enclave has been instantiated correctly. Upon
successful attestation, a secret key kP is provisioned to the ProgKT
3The Kostopayment mechanism can also be settled using other currencies that feature
similar properties of the Ethereum blockchain.
B CP
Escrow
(1a) Request (1b) Resource offer
(2b) pkg = ⟨ProgKT, Enc(kP , Input), AuxData⟩
(4a) Enc(kCP , Output)
(3) ProgKT enclave attestation & provision of kP
(2a) v (4b) v
Figure 1: An overview of Kosto architecture. The key kCP is
computed using a secret chosen by C and P’s secret session
key kP . Communication between P and C can be routed via
B. The payment escrow (depicted in greenly shaded ellippse)
is secured by the blockchain.
enclave, allowing it to process and compute on Input. Finally, the
result of the computation, namely Output is sent to P. We note
that Output is encrypted in such a way that its decryption by P
ensures full payment of v to C. Figure 1 depicts a workflow and
interactions between the three parties in Kosto.
3.2 System Goals
This section specifies primary desired properties that Kosto aims
to achieve, with respect to security, scalability, and usability. These
properties motivate and justify Kosto’s design choices.
Data confidentiality: Kosto ensures that Input, and secret states
of Program from an honest client remain encrypted outside the
enclave memory, and thus are not known to any other party, includ-
ing the compute node. The key to decrypt them resides only inside
the enclave. We remark that Kosto does not attempt to eliminate
Program’s side-channel leakage. However, it is compatible with
defense against these leakages [25, 38, 53].
Correct and attested execution: Kosto ensures that the output
obtained by the client correctly reflects the faithful execution of
Program on Input.
Fair exchange: Kosto assures that the work a compute node ex-
hausts in executing the outsourced task is accurately metered and
remunerated in fine granularity. At the same time, Kosto ensures
that a compute node gets the full reward for the outsourced compu-
tation if and only if a client gets a correct result of such computation.
Limited interaction between client and compute node: Kosto
unburdens clients from constantly maintaining a connection with
their assigned compute nodes prior to and during execution of the
outsourced computations.
3.3 Threat Model and Assumptions
We assume that an adversary is computationally bounded, and
that cryptographic primitives employed in Kosto are secure. We
further assume that trusted processors provisioniong the TEE, in
particular Intel SGX processor, is implemented correctly and its
protection mechanisms are not compromised. Although we do not
consider side-channel attacks against the hardware [60], Kosto is
fully compatible with defenses against these attacks [25, 38].
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We do not consider denial of service attack wherein an adversary
denies service to honest clients, or blocks honest compute nodes
from the system. As such, Kosto requires some compute nodes to
behave correctly so as to guarantee the system’s availability. We
study a strong adversary that are capable of corrupting any number
of clients and a majority (but not all) of the compute nodes.
An adversary compromising a compute node can control its op-
erating system, schedule its processes, reorder and tamper with its
network messages. However, it cannot tamper with the enclaves’
execution, nor observe theirs internal state. Compromised compo-
nents can deviate arbitrarily from the prescribed protocol.
Clients are mutually distrustful; i.e., they do not trust any other
client. We assume that when a client delegates computation of the
program Program, she trusts its code, and it is free of software bug.
To enable fair exchange between clients and compute nodes, Kosto
necessitates instrumenting Program into ProgKT that incorporates
dynamic runtime checks over the execution of Program. We assume
that all parties can verify such instrumentation which is simple
enough to lend itself to formal verification and vetting.
As mentioned earlier, the clients can serve as their own bro-
ker, handling compute node discovery, and performing their own
request-resource matching. As such, there will always be honest,
self-serving brokers in the system. In another word, Kosto does not
suffer from broker’s single-point-of-failure problem.
3.4 Design Roadmap
This section introduces SimpleMarket which serves as an elemen-
tary solution of a marketplace for outsourced computations. Subse-
quently, we analyze SimpleMarket’s shortcomings, based on which
we outline design choices for Kosto.
SimpleMarket. We assume that there exists a registry to which
clients can post requests and compute nodes advertise their re-
sources. The client P and compute node C actively scan for their
counterpart. Once they find a match, P and C update the status of
their request and offer to being served and occupied, respectively.
Let v be the remuneration that P pays to C in exchange for
executing Program on Input and delivering the result Output. P
sets up an escrow on the Ethereum blockchain with a deposit v ,
intended recipient C, a time-out T , and a hash-lock h. This escrow
holds the deposit v until being invoked with a settling transaction
tx containing data such thatH (data) = h, whereinH (·) is a secure
hash function [34]. If tx arrives before the time-out T , the escrow
sends v to C. Alternatively, if tx arrives after T has expired, v is
refunded to P.
SimpleMarket provides a compiler that allows P to transform
Program into a wrapper program ProgSM . In addition to Input,
ProgSM also consumes h and data. It checks if data can indeed
settle the escrow (i.e., H (data) = h) before executing Program on
Input to obtain Output. If data cannot settle the escrow, ProgSM
aborts the execution. We assume that P can formally verify the
correctness of the compilation.
After setting up the escrow, P sends pkg = ⟨ProgSM ,
Enc(kP , Input), AuxData⟩ to C, wherein Enc() is a symantically
secure symmetric-key encryption scheme [34], and AuxData con-
tains Enc(kP , data) along with h. C then instantiates a ProgSM
enclave. Next, P and the enclave engage in a remote attestation
procedure [17] which convinces P that the code loaded within the
enclave is indeed ProgSM . Furthermore, the remote attestation al-
lows P to establish a secure authenticated channel with the enclave,
via which they communicate the key kP . C supplies the enclave
with Enc(kP , Input) and AuxData. The enclave checks the validity
of data before executing Program on Input. Upon the completion
of the computation, the ProgSM returns to C the encrypted output
Enc(kP , Output) and data. C sends the encrypted output to P, and
claims the reward v using data.
SimpleMarket’s shortcomings. SimpleMarket protects the in-
tegrity of the outsourced computation, the confidentiality of the
client’s data, and guarantees remuneration for the compute nodes
once they finish the outsourced task. Nonetheless, SimpleMarket
still observes various shortcomings.
First, SimpleMarket rewards C based on task completion, which
exposes the payment to various fairness issues. On the one hand,
micro tasks yielding very small remunerations suffer from overhead
incurred by the transaction fee. On the other hand, if C inadver-
tently aborts the computation midway due to its unexpectedly large
resource consumption, it is not remunerated for the work it has
completed prior to the abortion. Even worse, C could deny P of the
computation result by dropping it after obtaining data, claiming
the reward without delivering the encrypted output to P.
Second, SimpleMarket requires P to remain online until its re-
quest is accepted by a compute node C to carry out a remote attes-
tation procedure and provision the key kP to the ProgSM enclave.
The procedure requires P to contact IAS for verifying the attesta-
tion it obtains from C. This is clearly inconvenient for P, especially
when the request demands uncommon resources or the IAS service
is temporarily unavailable.
Finally, SimpleMarket assumesP and C could efficiently discover
their counterparts. This assumption, however, may not hold true
in practice, causing the system to be under-utilised when requests
are not served despite there are available compute nodes.
4 KOSTO DESIGN
This section introduces Kosto’s design to overcome SimpleMarket’s
shortcomings. In particular, Kosto enables fair exchange between
P and C via a trusted work metering mechanism coupled with
a scalable protocol for micro payments. Further, it unburdens P
from remaining online and engaging in a remote attestation with C.
Finally, Kosto entrusts B to match clients’ requests with available
compute nodes, maximizing the system’s resource utilization.
4.1 Fair Exchange
Unlike SimpleMarket rewarding C based on task completion, Kosto
splits the rewardv of the outsourced computation into two portions,
namely vc = αv and vd = (1 − α)v , where α is a parameter set
by the client P, and agreed upon by C. The first portion (i.e., vc )
remunerates C for its work on a fine-grained basis, while the second
portion (i.e., vd ) rewards the delivery of the result.
More specifically, C is entitled to vc upon the completion of
the outsourced computation. In case C inadvertently aborts the
computation midway, it is still remunerated with a fraction of vc
according to its progress prior to the suspension. The remaining
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portion of v , namely vd , is only payable to C when the compu-
tation output is delivered to P. This discourages C from denying
P of the result as it may in SimpleMarket. Additional mechanism
that disincentivises result withholding (e.g., requiring C to make
a security deposit which is forfeited should they repeatedly abort
the computation [18, 36]) can also be incorporated into Kosto.
4.1.1 TEE-based metering. To enable a fair exchange described
above, Kosto has tometer the compute node’s work in a fine-grained
and tamper-proof fashion. We follow REM [61] in implementing a
reliable metering logic inside the enclave. More specifically, Kosto
requires the client’s program Program to be instrumented into a
wrapper program ProgKT. The wrapper program reserves the logic
of the original program (i.e., it executes Program’s logic on Input),
while keeping a counter of the number of instructions that has
been executed. This is then used as a measurement of the compute
node’s effort.
ProgKT maintains the instruction counter in a reserved register
which is inaccessiable to any other process. To prevent a malicious
Program from manipulating the instruction counter, Kosto does not
support Program that is multi-threaded or contains writeable code
pages [5, 61]. When the ProgKT enclave halts or exits, it returns a
“proof of work” (i.e., the number of instruction executed) based on
which Kosto settles the payment ofvc (or a fraction of it).We remark
that the restriction of single-threaded Program is not necessary a
severe limitation, for threading in SGX enclave is much different
compared to that of legacy software [3]. In particular, one cannot
create or destroy an SGX thread on the fly, and an SGX thread
is mapped directly to a logical processor. Consequently, a typical
SGX-compliant program (i.e., a program that inherently supports
SGX-enclave execution) is often single-threaded.
On the choice of instruction counting. One may argue that in-
structions are not the most accurate metric for CPU effort. Alterna-
tive metrics include CPU time and CPU cycles. Nevertheless, these
metrics are subject to manipulation by the malicious OS. Even if
they were not manipulated, they are incremented even when an en-
clave is swapped out [61]. Consequently, we believe that instruction
counting is the most appropriate method for securely measuring
the compute node’s effort using available tools in SGX.
4.1.2 Micro Payments with Off-Chain Payment Channel. One
naive approach to settle the proof of work is for C to send it to
P, who then responds with a transaction paying a corresponding
amount of reward to C. This approach, however, does not ensure
fairness in case P neglects her outsourced computation. Another
approach is to have P commit a number of equally-valued micro
transactions, each of which contains a fraction of vc , to a payment
escrow on the blockchain, and to structure the proof such that it can
be used to autonomously claim a subset or all of those micro trans-
actions. Nonetheless, settling a large number of micro transactions
on the blockchain incurs high overhead.
Kosto sidesteps this challenge by leveraging payment chan-
nel [12], allowing two parties to transact a large number of micro
payments without incurring high transaction fee or overloading
the blockchain with excessive number of transactions. It is assumed
that a payer and a payee maintain a payment channel (discussed in
section 2.2), and each micro payment is represented by a payment
B CP
Pick randB
hB = H (randB)
Pick ⟨s1, s2, . . . sn⟩, compute hi = H (si )
Pick randP , compute hP = H (randP )
h1
mB1 . . .
hn
mBn
hP hB
mBd
Pick randC
hC = H (randC)
h1
mC1 . . .
hn
mCn
hP hC
mCd
Collect Enc(kCP , Output) from ProgKT
Enc(kCP , Output)
randP
Figure 2: An overview of the fair exchange inKosto. The pay-
ment promisesmBi andm
C
i are hash-locked by hi . The pay-
ment promisemBd is hash-locked by hP and hB , whilem
C
d is
hash-locked by hP and hC . The key kCP is computed from
randC and the secret key kP .
promise to be communicated off-chain (i.e., off the blockchain) be-
tween the payer and the payee. To settle the payments, the payee
posted the latest payment promise it has received, claiming the
sum of all promises and thereby closing the channel. However, es-
tablishing a new channel for each pair of client and compute node
is inefficient. Kosto, instead, makes use of multi-hop channels4 to
better utilize the channel capacity, requiring fewer channels to be
established.
To this end, Kosto assumes that each client P maintains a pay-
ment channel with the broker B that, in turn, maintains a channel
with each compute node C. The payment from P to C does not
require the two parties to establish a channel. Instead, it could be se-
curely routed via B, in a sense that if C collects a payment from B,
it is guaranteed that B could also collect a corresponding payment
from P5. We assume that each payment channel has sufficiently
large capacity (i.e., the on-chain deposit that was set up at the be-
ginning of the channel) to accommodate the payment of various
outsourced computations during its lifetime.
Figure 2 summarizes the fair exchange of the reward v and the
outsourced computation of ProgKT. The payment of v is split over
n + 1 micro payments, n of which summing up to vc , while the last
one is worth vd . The protocol does not require any communication
between P and C prior to or during the computation, nor a direct
payment channel between the two parties. It, however, requires
an off-chain communication between P and C in the final step to
decrypt the output.
Payment of vc .Without loss of generality, let us assume that the
payment of vc is divided into n equally-valued payment promises,
which are routed via B. That is, P generates n payment promises
4While the channels can be bidirectional, our discussion focuses on unidirectional
channels. Extending Kosto to support bidirectional channels is trivial.
5B could charge P a service fee in return to routing the payment. Nonetheless, for
simplicity, we assume B offers such routing free of charge. Extending Kosto to support
such service fee is trivial.
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to B, and B generates the corresponding n payments promises to
C with the same value and claiming condition.
To generate the n payment promises ⟨mB1 ,mB2 , . . .mBn ⟩ to B,P first picks n random strings ⟨s1, s2, . . . sn⟩, and computes their
hashes ⟨h1,h2, . . .hn⟩ (i.e., hi = H (si )). A digest hi is used to lock
a promisemBi , such that B can only usemBi to close the channel if
it is aware of si such that H (si ) = hi . The payment promisemBi
is worth [debtP + (i ×vc )/n] wherein debtP is the accumulated
amount of unsettled payment for P’s previous requests. Finally, P
encrypts the random strings ⟨s1, s2, . . . sn⟩ with kP , and attaches
them as well as the payment promises to AuxData.
Similarly, B generates the corresponding promises
⟨mC1 ,mC2 , . . .mCn ⟩ to C. Each promise mCi is locked by hi
(i.e., the same hash-lock asmBi ), and worth [credC + (i × vc )/n]
wherein credC is the accumulated unsettled credit that C is
entitled to claim for its previous services. B includes these promises
into the AuxData before forwarding pkg to C.
Payment ofvd upon output delivery. To ensure that the remain-
ing portion ofv , namelyvd , can only be collected upon the delivery
of the output to P, ProgKT encrypts the output using a key kCP
derived from kP and a secret randC chosen and committed to by
C. At the same time, the full payment of v is encumbered until the
disclosure of randC .
As shown in Figure 2, besides the n payment promises above,
P generates another payment promise mBd to B that is worth[debtP+v] and is hash-locked by two digestshB andhP . Similarly,
B also generate one more payment promisemCd to C that is worth[credC +v], and hash-locked by hP and hC . The three hash-locks
hP , hB and hC can be settled by three independent settling-data
randP , randB and randC chosen independently at random by the
three parties P,B and C, respectively.
Dynamic Runtime Checks. The fair exchange requires the wrap-
per enclave ProgKT to perform some dynamic checks at runtime
prior to executing Program’s logic. More specifically, besides Input
and AuxData, ProgKT also consumes the hash-lockhC and randC . It
first verifies the validity of the settling-data ⟨s1, s2, . . . sn⟩ (i.e., hi =
H (si )∀⟨hi , si ⟩ ∈ AuxData). Next, it checks if hC = H (randC). Only
when the verification passes does it execute Program on Input, ob-
taining Output. It then encrypts Output with kCP = kP ⊕ randC ,
producing an encrypted output Enc(kCP , Output). Finally, the en-
clave returns the appropriate settling-data si based on the instruc-
tion counter and the encrypted output (if it successfully completes
the computation) to C.
Payment settlement. The settling-data si renders the promise
mCi claimable, enabling C to collect (a portion of) vc according to
its work. To obtain the settling-data necessary to claimmCd (i.e., the
full reward v), C has to send the encrypted output to P, who then
responds with randP . If C chooses to settle the payment thereby
closes the channel between C andB, it has to reveal both randP and
randC . This allows P to compute kCP and obtain Output, and B
to claimmBd . Alternatively, should C wish to maintain the channel,
it has to back propagate the settling-data to B and P so that they
PseudoCode 1 Attestation Manager Enclave
procedure ReceiveKeyFromP(kP )
keyID← Seal(kP );
// encrypts kP with the enclave’s Seal Key for persistent storage to disk
return keyID
procedure VerifyCert(CertKH,MKH)
b1 ←VerifySignature (CertKH);
πKH ← GetAttestation(CertKH);
b2 ←CheckMeasurement(πKH,MKH);
return b1 ∧ b2
procedure ProvisionKey(keyID, CertKH)
kP ← UnSeal(keyID);
pkKH ← GetPK(CertKH);
channelID← EstablishSecureChannel(C, pkKH);
// inter-platform channel between B’s AM and C’s KH
Send(channelID,kP );
can update credC and debtP accordingly6. In a situation where
P’s response is invalid (i.e., its digest produced by the standard
hash function H (·) does not match hP ), C can check this invalidity
locally and use it as a evidence to accuse P of conducting mischief.
In such situation, fairness property is still guaranteed; i.e., C does
not claim vd from B, who in turn does not claim vd from P and P
cannot decrypt Enc(kCP , Output) to obtain Output.
4.2 Delegated Attestation
Unlike SimpleMarket, Kosto relieves P from conducting a remote
attestation with C at the beginning of every request execution by
implementing a delegated attestation scheme. The scheme requires
each broker B to run an attestation manager enclave AM (detailed
in Algorithm 1), and each compute node C to run a key handler
enclave KH (detailed in Algorithm 2). The execution of AM and KH
are protected by Intel SGX.
Without loss of generality, the delegated attestation builds a
chain of trust that comprises three links. The first and second links
are established via remote attestations between P as a validator
and AM as an attesting enclave, and AM as a validator and KH as an
attesting enclave. The final link entails ProgKT enclave to prove
its correctness to KH via local attestation. Chaining all three links
together, P gains confidence that the ProgKT enclave has been
properly instantiated on the compute node C using the correct
code, without contacting C or the IAS.
Each attestation manager enclave has its own (unique) public
and private key pair ( pkAM, skAM) that are generated uniformly at
random during the enclave instantiation. Upon successfully instanti-
ating AM, B requests the trusted processor for its remote attestation
πAM = ⟨MAM, pkAM⟩σT EE , whereMAM is the enclave’s measurement,
and σT EE is a group signature signed by the processor’s private
key. The certificate πAM attests for the correctness of the AM enclave
and its public key. Nonetheless, the only party that can verify πAM
is the IAS acting as group manager [17]. Kosto converts πAM into a
publicly verifiable certificate by having B obtain and store the IAS
response CertAM = ⟨πAM, validity⟩σIAS where σIAS is the IAS’s
6In case the computation is inadvertently aborted midway and thus no output is
produced, the promise to be settled ismCi and settling-data is si .
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PseudoCode 2 Key Handler Enclave
procedure ReceiveKeyFromAM(kP )
keyID← Seal(kP );
// encrypts kP with the enclave’s Seal Key for persistent storage to disk
return keyID
procedure VerifyLocalAtt(ψProgKT,MProgKT)
//ψprog is local attestation of the ProgKT enclave
b1 ←VerifyMAC (ψProgKT);
b2 ←CheckMeasurement(ψProgKT,MProgKT);
return b1 ∧ b2
procedure SendKeyLocal(keyID,ψprog)
kP ← UnSeal(keyID);
channelID← EstablishLocalSecureChannel(ψProgKT);
// intra-platform channel, for both KH and ProgKT are instantiated on C
Send(channelID,kP );
P BAM
CKH ProgKT
(1) CertAM
(2b) kP
(2b) pkg
(3
)C
er
t K
H
(4a
) k P
(4b)
pkg (5) C instantiates
ProgKT enclave
(6)ψProgKT
(7) kP
Figure 3: An overview of the delegated attestation scheme.
The trusted enclaves are depicted in greenly shaded
rectanlges.
publicly verifiable signature on πAM and the validity flag. By ex-
amining CertAM, the enclave code and its measurement MAM, any
party can verify the correctness of and establish a secure connection
to the AM enclave.
Likewise, every compute node C runs a key handler enclave KH .
C obtains (from the IAS) and stores a publicly verifiable certificate
CertKH= ⟨πKH , valid⟩σIAS , where πKH is KH’s remote attestation
containing its measurement MKH and its unique public key pkKH.
By examining CertKH, any party can be assured of the correctness
of KH and communicate securely with it.
Delegated Attestation Protocol. Figure 3 depicts the workflow
of Kosto’s delegated attestation. After instrumenting Program into
ProgKT and verifying the correctness of the instrumentation, P
initiates the delegated attestation by obtaining CertAM from B
and verifies its validity. It then establishes a secure and authen-
ticated channel with AM using pkAM. P then sends pkg = ⟨ProgKT7,
Enc(kP , Input), AuxData⟩ to B, and kP to AM via the secure chan-
nel. Once B finds a compute node C that is willing to match P’s re-
quest, AM obtains CertKH from C, verifies its validity, and establishes
7Should P want to hide ProgKT from B, she could also encrypt it with kP , and sends
Enc(kP, ProgKT) instead.
a secure and authenticated connection with C’s KH to communi-
cate kP . B then sends pkg to C. The compute node instantiates an
enclave to execute ProgKT, and performs a local attestation with KH
to prove its correctness. Upon successfully attestation, KH sends the
key kP to the ProgKT enclave. Once the ProgKT enclave completes
the computation, it returns the encrypted output, which is then
sent to P (perhaps being routed through B).
This mechanism only invokes IAS to obtain attestation certifi-
cates for AM and KH, instead of constantly involving IAS in every
task execution as SimpleMarket does. Further, it allows P to post a
request (along with the payment) and then go offline until the time
she wishes to collect the output, as opposed to remaining online
till her request is picked up by some computation node.
4.3 Task Assignment for Maximum Resource
Utilization
Kosto designates to B the task of node discovery, load balancing
and request-resource matching. More specifically, B collects re-
quests from clients and advertise of available resource capacities
from compute nodes, and to evaluate the optimal assignments of
requests to compute nodes that maximises the resource utilization
of compute nodes or number of requests that are served at every
time instance.
We assume that each request is associated with a resource speci-
fication requirement, and each resource offer indicates the compute
node’s available computational capacity. We further assume that
there is no need for redundant execution (i.e., each request is as-
signed to one compute node), and a compute node serves only one
request at a time. Let R = ⟨r1, r2, . . . , rp ⟩ be the set of pending
requests, and O = ⟨C1,C2, . . . ,Cq⟩ be the set of available compute
nodes. The request assignment of R to O is the set A comprising
tuples of form ⟨ri ,Cj ⟩, wherein a compute node Cj has sufficient
computational capacity to serve a request ri . The optimization goal
is to maximize the number of such tuples (i.e., |A|).
The request assignment problem is reducible to a maximum bi-
partite matching problem [59]. A bipartite graph consists of vertices
that can be divided into two independent sets such that there is no
edge connecting vertices of same set. A maximum matching in a
bipartite graph is a largest subset of the graph’s edges such that no
pair of edges in such a subset share an endpoint.
To reduce Kosto’s request assignment problem to the maximum
bipartite matching problem, we create a graph G = (V ,E) wherein
V is the set of vertices, and E is the set of edges. V contains two
independent subsets, V1 and V2, wherein |V1 | = |R | and |V2 | = |O |.
We represent each request ri by a vertex vi ∈ V1, and a compute
node Cj by a vertex v |R |+j ∈ V2. We add an edge ei j that connects
vi and v |R |+j if the compute node Cj has sufficient computational
capacity to satisfy the resource specification requirement of request
ri . Since every edge in the graph G connects a vertex in V1 to a
vertex in V2, G is a bipartite graph. The maximum matching in G
indicates the maximum request assignment of R to O , in which an
edge euv in the maximum matching suggests the request ru to be
assigned to the compute node Cv .
We expect that a typical request in Kosto can be served by a
common compute node. This assumption renders the bipartite
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graph that represents all potential assignments of requests to com-
pute nodes dense. The most efficient algorithm to find a maximum
matching in a dense bipartite graph is the Mucha-Sankowski al-
gorithm [43]. This algorithm is randomized, and operates based
on the fast matrix multiplcation algorithm. As such, it attains a
running time complexity of O(|V |ω ), where ω is the exponent of
the best known matrix multiplication algorithm (the best known
algorithm to date is Le Gall algorithm [37], with ω < 2.373).
5 SECURITY ANALYSIS
5.1 Fair exchange
TEE-based metering. To enable fair exchange between client’s
payment and compute node’s computation, Kosto necessitates dy-
namic runtime checks incorporated within the enclave that houses
the outsourced computation. We implement this by providing a
compiler that instruments any SGX-compliant program Program
into a wrapper program ProgKT. We believe that these additional
steps and the overall instrumentation are simple enough to lend
themselves to formal verification and vetting by Program writer, or
by the client.
As we mentioned earlier, the original Program should not con-
tain writable code pages, for they would allow the program to
rewrite itself at runtime and thus evade the instrumentation. This
could be enforced by requiring the code page to have either write or
executable permission exclusively (i.e., it cannot have both permis-
sion at the same time). This practice has also been recommended
by Intel to the enclave writers [5].
In addition, Kosto requires Program to be single-threaded. While
the instruction counter is maintained in a reserved register which is
inaccessible to any other processes (Section 4.1.1), it remains acces-
sible by different threads of Program, should it be multi-threaded.
Thus, a malicious program that has multiple threads could ma-
nipulate the instruction counter value by carefully crafting the
interactions of its threads.
Payment of vc . Kosto builds on payment channel [12] to enable
efficient micro payments and relies on the security of the Ethereum
blockchain to ensure payment escrow is faithfully executed. To
optimize for efficiency and avoid overloading the blockchain, Kosto
securely routes payment from P to C via the broker B. A careful
design of hash-lock payment promises, wherein promise from P to
B, and that of B to C could be settled using the same settling-data,
guarantees that B can always claim from P which he pays to C on
behalf of P.
Ensuring Output Delivery. At the end of the computation,
ProgKT enclave encrypts the Output using key kCP = kP ⊕randC .
SincemCd is partially locked by randC , the decryption of the output
and the settling of mCd are bound together. Should C deny P of
the output, it would have to forfeit vd . While this act weakens the
availability of the system, it does not violate fairness guarantee.
5.2 Delegated Attestation
Kosto’s delegated attestation relies on AM and KH enclaves to attest
correct instantiation of ProgKT enclave. Therefore, their correct
instantiations are of utter importance. Fortunately, these enclave are
fixed (as opposed to the ProgKT enclave that houses client-defined
program), and thus are easy to vet and verify.
Kosto’s delegated attestation requires minimal involvement
of P (i.e., examine the publicly verifiable certificates CertAM =
⟨πAM, validity⟩σIAS ). By checking that πAM indeed contains the
expected measurementMAM, that its validity flag indicates valid,
and that the certificate has been properly certified (using Intel’s
published public key [11]), P can ascertain the correct instantia-
tion of AM. Moreover, using the public key pkAM included in πAM, P
can establish a secure and authenticated channel to AM via which
the secret key kP is communicated. Likewise, AM can verify the
correct instantiation of KH and securely communicate kP to the
latter in the exact same manner. The security of the local attesta-
tion and communication between KH and ProgKT enclave follows
directly from Intel SGX’s specifications [17]. Therefore, provided
that cryptographic primitives in use are secure, and SGX hard-
ware protection mechanisms are not subverted, Kosto’s delegated
attestation is secure.
5.3 Attested Execution and Data
Confidentiality
Kosto’s relies on Intel SGX [41] to offer attested execution and data
confidentiality to outsourced computations. In particular, SGX en-
ables isolated execution [54] ensuring that code loaded and running
inside the enclaves cannot be tampered with by any other processes
including the operating system or hypervisor. This, in combination
with attestation capabilities, allows Kosto to offer attested execu-
tion in which the computation correctness is guaranteed. Moreover,
data (i.e., input, output) and secret states of the enclave execution
always remain encrypted outside of the enclave memory, thus their
confidentiality are guaranteed. Furthermore, SGX memory encryp-
tion engine is capable of protecting data integrity and preventing
memory replay attacks [32, 40].
Nonetheless, SGX’s attested execution does not inherently offer
protections against side-channel leakages [27, 52, 60]. The access
pattern incurred by data (or code page) moving between the en-
clave and the non-enclave environment (e.g., page fault) could leak
sensitive information about the code or data being processed within
the enclave. Such side-channel leakage could be mitigated by en-
suring that the enclave execution is data oblivious; i.e., the access
pattern no longer depends on the input data [25]. While Kosto
does not explicitly eliminate side-channel leakage, it could benefit
from a vast amount of research on defenses against side-channel
leakages [23, 25, 38, 52, 53], which we shall incorporate into Kosto
in future work.
6 EVALUATION
This section reports empirical evaluation of our prototype imple-
mentation of Kosto. We are interested in quantifying the overhead
of enclave over non-enclave (and thus untrusted) execution (Sec-
tion 6.2) and the cost of task matching (Section 6.3).
6.1 Experimental Setup
All experiments are conducted on a system that is equipped with
Intel i7-6820HQ 2.70GHz CPU, 16GB RAM, 2TB hard drive, and
running Ubuntu 16.04 Xenial Xerus. We evaluate the overhead of
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Figure 4: Kosto’s enclave execution overhead. The running
time of each benchmark is normalized against its own base-
line mode’s.
Kosto’s enclave execution using a number of computational tasks
including five benchmarks (i.e., mcf, deepsjeng, leela, exchang2, and
xz) selected from SPEC CPU2017 [14], and two standard crypto-
graphic operations (i.e., SHA256 and AES Encryption). The enclave
trusted codebases are implemented using Intel SGX SDK [4]. To
quantify the cost of task matching in Kosto, we measure the run-
time of the Mucha-Sankowski algorithm [43] that we implemented
in C. All experiments are repeated over 10 runs, and the average
results are reported.
6.2 Cost of Enclave Execution
Overhead in Execution Time. We evaluate the five SPEC
CPU2017 benchmarks in three different execution modes, namely
baseline, SGX-compliant and Kosto-compliant. The baseline mode
compiles the benchmarks as-is and runs them in untrusted exe-
cution environment. SGX-compliant mode requires porting the
benchmarks to support SGX-enclave execution. This entails replac-
ing standard system calls and libraries in the original code with
SGX-compliant ones supported in the SGX SDK [4]. Finally, the
Kosto-compliant mode further instruments SGX-compliant code
with dynamic runtime checks and TEE-based metering discussed
in previous section.
Figure 4 compares the running time of the five benchmarks in
three modes, with the running time of each benchmark normalized
against its own baseline. We observe that the SGX-compliant mode
incurs from 1.5× to 3.7× overhead over the baseline. This overhead
is mostly due to enclave’s control switching. The instrumentations
introduced in Kosto-compliant mode incur an extra 8% ∼ 14%
overhead relative to the SGX-compliant mode.
We remark that our porting of the five benchmarks to SGXmight
not be optimized. Thus, the results reported in Figure 4 are likely an
over-estimation of the real overhead that enclave execution incurs
over unstrusted non-enclave execution. Various techniques have
been proposed for minimizing the overhead of enclave execution,
typically by reducing the control switching between the enclave
code and the untrusted application that services OS-provided func-
tions [46, 55, 58]. We leave the incorporation of such optimization
into Kosto for future work.
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Figure 5: Comparison between throughput of enclave and
non-enclave based cryptographic operations.
Table 1: Running time of Mucha-Sankowski algorithm.
|V| 1000 2000 4000 8000 16000
Running time (s) 0.07 0.43 1.83 9.72 47.96
Overhead in Throughput. Next, we measure the overhead
in throughput incurred by enclave execution on computation-
intensive works. This set of experiments measure performances of
SHA256 and AES-GCM encryption operations under OpenSSL [9]
and Intel SGXSSL [7] implementations against exponentially in-
creasing input size (ranging from 256B to 4MB). OpenSSL imple-
mentation runs in an untrusted non-enclave memory, whereas
SGXSSL ports OpenSSL to support SGX enclave execution.
Figure 5a shows a significant gap between the throughput of
SGXSSL and OpenSSL implementations of SHA256 when a mes-
sage size is small (e.g., OpenSSL’s throughput is upto 5× for 1KB
message). Nonetheless, such a gap reduces as the message size in-
creases (e.g., as small as 1.5× for 4MB message). A similar trend is
observed in throughput of AES-GCM encryption (the decryption
throughput is similar), with the throughput overhead incurred by
enclave execution reduces from 6.3× for 1KB message to 3% for
4MB message. We attribute this throughput gap to the I/O cost and
context switching that enclave execution incurs. Fortunately, this
overhead is amortized as the input size increases.
6.3 Cost of Task Matching
Finally, we evaluate the performance of Kosto task assignment by
measuring the runtime of Mucha-Sankowski algorithm. The algo-
rithm runs in O(|V |2.38), where |V | is the total number of vertices
in the graph.
Table 1 reports running time of the Mucha-Sankowski algorithm
on dense bipartite graphs whose densities (i.e., D = 2 |V ||V |( |V |−1) )
range from 0.8 to 0.9. As expected, the running time grows quadrat-
ically with respect to the input size. This limits the task assignment
algorithm to offer real-time performance only when the number
of requests and compute nodes are small (e.g., 4000). To offer real-
time performance at scale, Kosto expects a number of brokers offer
competing services. Alternatively, a single broker can trade the
optimality of the task assignment for lower cost of task matching
by splitting requests and compute nodes into multiple batches, and
evaluating the batches in parallel.
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7 RELATEDWORKS
Decentralised outsourced computation. Golem [2] also ex-
plores a marketplace for outsourced computation. Unlike Kosto, it
does not feature the attested execution environment. Consequently,
Golem needs to redundantly execute the same task on multiple
compute nodes in order to verify the execution correctness.
Concurrent to our work, AirTNT [16] proposes the use of enclave
execution for outsourced computations, and devises a protocol that
allows fair exchange between the client and the compute nodes.
Such protocol necessitates a separate payment channel for every
pair of client and compute node, and requires constant communi-
cation between the two parties over the course of the outsourced
computation (i.e., highly interactive). Kosto, in contrast, alleviates
the client and the compute nodes from these inconveniences.
CryptoCurrency and Off-Chain Payment Channel. Cryp-
tocurrencies allow two willing parties to transact directly via an
open and decentralized blockchain [44]. Beyond a means of trans-
acting, blockchain architectures have been developed for various
purposes, such as enabling a Turing-complete smart contract plat-
form [20] or enhancing transaction [8, 48] privacy. We refer readers
to [19] for a comprehensive overview of cryptocurrencies.
Current prominent cryptocurrencies can only support limited
transaction throughputs. As a result, various off-chain payment
solutions have been presented. Lighting network [47] and Raiden
network [12] are earlier off-chain payment solutions proposed for
Bitcoin and Ethereum, respectively. Sprites [42] and Revive [35]
optimize the costs of indirect off-chain payments, while Bolt [31] al-
lows privacy-preserving off-chain payment channels. Kosto design
has thus far only tapped on a basic feature of payment channels,
and can certainly benefit from their further developments.
Reliable Resource Accounting. Early approaches to resource
accounting in the context of outsourced computations rely on
nested virtualization and TPMs, or place a trusted resource observer
underneath the service provider’s software [22, 51]. Alternatively,
REM [61] instruments the client’s program with dynamic runtime
checks that maintain an instruction counter to self account its com-
putational effort. The correctness and integrity of these runtime
checks are enforced by the trusted hardware. Kosto adopts REM’s
approach in metering the compute nodes’ work.
SGX-based systems. Trusted hardware, in particular Intel SGX
processors, have been used to enhance security in various applica-
tion domains, including data analytics [25, 27, 49], machine learn-
ing [45] and outsourced storage [23, 26]. In addition, SGX has also
been utilized to scale the blockchain [10, 24]. To our knowledge,
Kosto is the first solution to provision a full-fledged fair marketplace
for secure outsourced computations using Intel SGX.
8 CONCLUSION
We have presented Kosto – a framework enabling fair marketplace
for secure outsourced computations. Kosto protects confidential-
ity of clients’ input, integrity of the computations, and ensures
fair exchange between the clients and the compute nodes. Our ex-
periments show that Kosto incurs small overheads, as low as 3%
for computation-intensive operations, and 1.5× for I/O-intensive
operations over non-enclave and untrustworthy execution.
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